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Introduction
The theory of fair allocation studies allocation rules which select, for every economy in a given class, a subset of feasible allocations on the basis of efficiency and fairness properties. It was initiated by Foley (1967) , Kolm (1972) and Varian (1974) among others, who focussed on the concept of no-envy. Since then it has been extended to cover many other notions of fairness and a great variety of economic contexts (production, public goods, etc.) by many authors.
1 This theory contains some negative results, because it is usually impossible to find solutions which satisfy all conceivable requirements of efficiency and equity simultaneously, but its hallmark is a richness of positive results. By now, not only are there many interesting allocation rules uncovered in the literature, but also they are fully characterized as the only rules satisfying some sets of reasonable axioms.
Compared to the theory of social choice, this makes a great contrast. In social choice theory, Arrow's impossibility theorem has been shown to remain valid in most economic or abstract contexts. This theorem, like all the theory of social choice, is about social preferences which rank all options in a given set on the basis of individual preferences over these options. The theorem states that there is no way to construct social preferences as a function of individual preferences if this function is required to satisfy basic principles of unanimity (Weak Pareto: if everybody prefers x to y, so does society), impartiality (Non-Dictatorship: no individual can always impose his strict preferences) and informational parsimony (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: social preferences over any subset of alternatives depend only on individual preferences over this subset).
Impossibilities in social choice theory, possibilities in fair allocation theory. This contrast requires an explanation. Most authors have stressed two differences between the two theories. The one most often mentioned is about preferences versus selection. Varian (1974) argues as follows:
'Social [choice] theory asks for too much out of the process in that it asks for an entire ordering of the various social states (allocations in this case). The original question asked only for a "good" allocation; there was no requirement to rank all allocations. The fairness criterion in fact limits itself to answering the original question. It is limited in that it gives no indication of the merits of two nonfair allocations, but by restricting itself in this way it allows for a reasonable solution to the original problem. ' (p. 65) Similarly, Kolm (1996) is ironic about social preferences:
'The requirement of a social ordering is indeed problematic at first sight: Why would we want to know the 193th best alternative? Only the first best is required for the choice. ' (p. 439) In his famous survey on social choice theory, Sen (1986) also emphasizes this contrast:
'The specified subset is seen as good, but there is no claim that they represent the "best" alternatives, all equally choosable. There is no attempt to give an answer to the overall problem of social choice, and the exercise is quite different from the specification of a social preference over X. ' (p. 1106) And most recently, Moulin and Thomson (1997) have compared the two theories in these terms:
'In social choice theory, the focus is commonly on obtaining a complete ranking of the set of feasible alternatives as a function of the profile of individual preferences. (...) Consider now the axiomatic investigations of resource allocation. As their counterparts in the theory of cooperative games, their focus is on the search for allocation rules, no attempt being made at obtaining a complete ranking of the entire feasible set. ' (p. 104) The second difference noticed by these authors is that economic models enable the analyst to take account of the structure of allocations. Varian mentions only the fact that the theory of fairness can focus on self-centered preferences (individuals being interested only in their own consumption), while Sen has written about the fairness literature: 'First, it has shown the relevance of informational parameters that the traditional social choice approaches have tended to ignore in the single-minded concern with individual orderings of complete social states. Comparisons of different persons' positions within a state have been brought into the calculation, enlarging the informational basis of social judgments. Second, in raising rather concrete questions regarding states of affairs, the fairness literature has pushed social choice theory in the direction of more structure. ' (p. 1111) Similarly, Moulin and Thomson have argued that 'the models of resource allocation take full account of the microeconomic structure of the problems to be solved. (...) This descriptive richness permits a great deal of flexibility at two levels. First, properties of allocation rules can be formulated directly in terms of the physical attributes of the economy (...). Second, the rich mathematical structure of microeconomic models gives rise to a host of variations on each general principle. ' (p. 105) However, this second difference is about additional requirements formulated in a richer framework, and can hardly explain the relative success of the theory of fairness. This was noted by Moulin and Thomson, who have concluded:
'Note that social choice theory itself has recently developed in a similar direction, widening its framework by incorporating information about economic environments (...). But as its objective has remained to obtain complete rankings of sets of feasible alternatives, its conclusions have so far remained largely negative.' (ibid.) Actually, Arrow's initial presentation of his theorem (Arrow 1950 (Arrow , 1951 was already formulated in an economic setting, with self-centered preferences. Therefore one can safely conclude that the common explanation for the possibility results in the theory of fairness is that it does not seek a full-fledged ordering.
The problem we address in this paper is that this common explanation is technically incomplete and therefore unconvincing. An allocation rule, in effect, splits the set of allocations in two parts, the good and the bad. Even though the ambition is not to give an ordering of allocations, this twofold partition is, formally, an ordering. A coarse ordering is still an ordering. It is a partial ordering if the good allocations are deemed noncomparable, and similarly for the bad ones, as suggested above by Varian and Sen. But one may also consider that it gives a complete ordering simply by declaring all good allocations, and respectively all bad allocations, to be socially equivalent. We will later refer to these two interpretations as the "partial ordering" version and the "complete ordering" version, respectively.
If all the allocation rules in the theory of fairness yield orderings, it remains totally unexplained why and how the theory of fair allocation avoids Arrow's impossibility. There may be some truth in the idea that a coarse ordering is more easily constructed than a fine-grained one, but one cannot say that a coarse ordering is not an ordering and is outside the reach of Arrow's theorem.
As a consequence, the only convincing explanation for the possibility results in fair allocation theory must be based on the violation of some conditions of Arrow's theorem. The first candidate, among Arrow's conditions, is completeness of the ordering. This is in line with the "partial ordering" interpretation of allocation rules. The problem is that under the "complete ordering" interpretation, allocation rules do provide complete orderings. Therefore this cannot be the desired explanation.
2 If one can derive complete orderings from the theory of fairness, the explanation must be that this theory violates one of the three core axioms of Arrow's theorem: Weak Pareto, Non-Dictatorship, or Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
These three axioms will be formally defined in the next sections, after the model and notations are introduced. The main conclusion that will be derived in this paper is that the theory of fairness succeeds in obtaining possibility results mainly because it abandons the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. It relies on more information about individual preferences (at "irrelevant" alternatives) than allowed by this axiom. This idea was already informally put forth by Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996) , who claimed moreover that the kind of additional information used by the theory of fairness would be enough to get round Arrow's impossibility in the theory of social choice as well.
Here we will show, however, that relaxing Weak Pareto is also part of the picture, and this is an inevitable consequence of the fact that the ordering is coarse. Our analysis will therefore show that there is some truth in the usual explanation. More precisely, coarse orderings naturally suggest weakenings of the Weak Pareto principle which make it less necessary to depart from Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. With the full Weak Pareto principle for social orderings, avoiding Arrow's impossibility would require a more drastic weakening of the independence condition. Therefore our second important conclusion will be that the theory of social choice needs more information than the theory of fair allocation, although both need to relax the independence condition. This part of our analysis will rely heavily on a companion paper which studies how much weakening of the independence condition is required in the theory of social choice (Fleurbaey, Suzumura and Tadenuma 2001) . The paper has the following structure. The next section introduces the model and the main notions. Allocation rules are confronted to Arrow's axioms in Section 3. In Section 4 we then discuss some weak variants of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Section 5 presents the main results, and Section 6 compares the informational basis of the theory of fairness to that of social choice theory. In Section 7 we propose a unified theory of social choice and fairness, and discuss the relative merits of alternative "grand unification" theories. Section 8 concludes.
Model and definitions

The model
The population is fixed. Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of agents where 2 ≤ n < ∞. There are goods indexed by k = 1, ..., where 2 ≤ < ∞. Agent i's consumption bundle is a vector
A preordering is a reflexive and transitive binary relation. Agent i's preferences are described by a complete preordering R i (strict preference P i ,
Let R be the set of continuous, convex, and strictly monotonic preferences over R + .
Let π be a bijection on N.
There is no production in our model, and the amount of total resources is fixed and represented by the vector ω ∈ R ++ . An allocation
3 Let F be the set of all feasible allocations. For each R ∈ R n , let E(R) denote the set of Pareto-efficient allocations. Because of strict monotonicity of preferences, there is no need to distinguish Pareto-efficiency in the strong sense and in the weak sense.
A social ordering function (SOF) is a functionR defined on R n , such that for all R ∈ R n ,R(R) is a complete preordering on the set of allocations F . LetP (R) (resp.Ī(R)) denote the strict preference (resp. indifference) relation derived fromR(R).
An allocation rule (AR) is a set-valued mapping S defined on R n , such that 4 for all R ∈ R n , S(R) is a non-empty subset of F . An AR S is essentially single-valued if all selected allocations are Pareto-indifferent:
To each AR S can be associated the (two-tier) SOFR S defined as follows: for all R ∈ R n , and all x, y ∈ F,
One then has: for all R ∈ R n , and all x, y ∈ F,
When a SOF has only two indifference classes, and is therefore associated to an AR, we will call it an ARSOF. We will say that an ARSOF is essentially single-valued if its associated AR is essentially single-valued. Conversely, from any SOFR, we can derive the AR SR by selecting the subset of first best allocations: for all R ∈ R n ,
By the definitions, we have, for any AR S :
3 Vector inequalities are denoted as usual: ≥, >, and . 4 An alternative definition of SOFs and ARs makes them a function of ω as well as R. This is useful when changes in ω are studied, but here we focus only on the information about preferences, and since ω is kept fixed throughout the paper, we omit this argument.
Arrow's axioms
We are now ready to give precise definitions of Arrow's three conditions.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
In economic domains, it is common to refine the definition of nondictatorship so as to allow for slight strengthenings of the usual axiom. Let X ⊂ F be any subset of allocations.
Non-Dictatorship (over X):
There does not exist i 0 ∈ N such that:
In addition to these axioms, it will be useful to refer to a full anonymity condition, which is stronger than Non-Dictatorship but quite appealing on grounds of impartiality:
xR(R) y ⇔ π(x)R(π(R)) π(y).
Allocation rules and Arrow's axioms
In this section, we examine how ARSOFs, as a particular kind of SOFs, fare with respect to satisfying Arrow's axioms. Let us start with the last one. The Anonymity axiom raises no difficulty to ARSOFs, and it is worth noticing that it then actually boils down to the following simple condition:
It is interesting that, moreover, the Non-Dictatorship axiom will (for sufficiently large X) always be trivially satisfied by ARSOFs, since it is impossible for any agent to impose his fine-grained preferences to a coarse social ordering.
The Weak Pareto principle, by contrast, cannot be satisfied by ARSOFs. Since there usually are many occurrences of Pareto-domination among Pareto inefficient allocations, this axiom requires a too fine-grained ranking of allocations. Hence, ARSOFs usually satisfy only weakenings of the Weak Pareto principle. Notice first that the original Weak Pareto principle for ARSOFs can be written as:
5
A priori, one may consider three kinds of weakenings of this original axiom, depending on whether the conclusion of the weakened axiom retains:
This yields three different axioms, which we now examine in turn.
Weak Weak Pareto α: ∀R ∈ R
This axiom is the most relevant weakening of Weak Pareto for our purposes, because it is equivalent to one of the fundamental axioms in the theory of fair allocation, namely:
Pareto-Efficiency: ∀R ∈ R n , SR(R) ⊆ E(R).
The second weakening of Weak Pareto is the following:
This is equivalent to:
That is, SR(R) must contain all feasible allocations that Pareto dominate some feasible allocations. This is not reasonable. The third weakening, however, is logically weaker than Weak Weak Pareto α and deserves some attention:
This is equivalent to the following condition:
If an ARSOFR satisfies this condition, then for each R ∈ R n , there exists T ⊆ F such that )}. Let us finally consider IIA. For an ARSOF, this axiom is quite demanding, since it requires that if an allocation is selected while another is not, this does not change when individual preferences relative to these two allocations remain the same, independently of preferences over other allocations. It may be useful to write down this condition explicitly in order to make this point clear:
For ARSOFs, the above axiom is rigorously equivalent to the original IIA axiom. This may be understood by checking that IIA can equivalently be written with the conclusion
and recalling that xP (R) y ⇔ x ∈ SR(R) and y / ∈ SR(R).
IIA and Weak Weak Pareto
The fact that IIA for ARSOFs is very strong is captured in the following result, which says that it implies that social preferences are totally independent of individual preferences.
Proposition 1 An ARSOFR satisfies IIA if and only if SR is a constant function.
Proof. It is obvious that a constant ARSOF satisfies IIA. For the converse, choose i 0 ∈ N and define x 0 ∈ F by x
n one has S(R) = F , then S is a constant function. Suppose then that this is not the case, and let R ∈ R n be such that S(R) = F. First case: x 0 ∈ S(R). Take any y / ∈ S(R). By monotonicity of preferences, for all R ∈ R n ,
Therefore x 0 ∈ S(R ) and y / ∈ S(R ). The latter implies F \S(R) ⊂ F \S(R ). Since x 0 ∈ S(R ), one can show by a symmetrical argument that F \ S(R ) ⊂ F \ S(R) implying S(R ) = S(R).
Second case:
one can show that S(R ) ⊂ S(R).
Contrary to what one might expect, this does not exactly entail an Arrovian impossibility. In fact, there are ARSOFs satisfying IIA and Weak Weak Pareto principles. Let us first examine the implication of IIA together with the weakest of our Weak Pareto principles, namely Weak Weak Pareto γ. Let F * be the set of feasible allocations with no zero bundle:
The message of the following proposition is that even with the weakest version of the Weak Pareto principle, under IIA we are not allowed much room to consider various ARSOFs.
Proposition 2 If an ARSOFR satisfies Weak Weak Pareto γ and IIA, then either for all
Proof. Let R ∈ R n be given. Suppose that
that is, there exists y ∈ SR(R) such that for all i ∈ N, y i < ω. We may assume that y = 0. For if y = 0, then there exists y ∈ F such that y 0, and hence for all j ∈ N, y j P j y j . SinceR satisfies Weak Weak Pareto γ, we have y ∈ SR(R).
Thus, without loss of generality, assume that 0 < y 1 < ω. We need to show that F * ⊆ SR(R).
Without loss of generality, assume that y 11 > 0 and y 12 < ω 2 .
Define z ∈ F as follows: (1) z 11 = 0 and z 12 = ω 2 , (2) for all i ∈ N with i = 1, z i1 = y i1 + y 11 n−1 and z i2 = 0, and (3) for all j ∈ N and all k ∈ {1, . . . , } with k = 1, 2, z ik = y ik .
n ) be the profile of preferences represented by the following utility functions:
. . , R n ) be the profile of preferences represented by the following utility functions:
For all i ∈ N, y i P i t i . Because t ∈ SR(R) and SR is constant, we have t ∈ SR(R ). Then, by Weak Weak Pareto γ, y ∈ SR(R ). Hence, since SR is constant, y ∈ SR(R).
With Pareto-Efficiency (Weak Weak Pareto α), which is stronger than Weak Weak Pareto γ, one gets a full characterization of an ARSOF if Anonymity is introduced, as stated in the following theorem. However, the ARSOF thus characterized is special in that it selects allocations in which one individual gets all resources. Then, the second part of the theorem shows that a kind of Arrovian dictatorship is not far away. By replacing Anonymity with essential single-valuedness, one gets a dictatorial ARSOF which always gives all resources to the same individual.
Theorem 1 There is only one ARSOFR satisfying Pareto-Efficiency, IIA and Anonymity, namely:
If an ARSOFR satisfies Pareto-Efficiency, IIA and is essentially singlevalued, then
Proof. By Proposition 2 and Pareto-Efficiency, for all R ∈ R n ,
SinceR is a constant, for all R, R ∈ R n ,
Therefore Anonymity requires
whereas essential single-valuedness requires
From Proposition 2, the second part of Theorem 1 can be strengthened by replacing Pareto-Efficiency with Weak Weak Pareto γ in the hypothesis. It should then be noted that even with the weakest version of Weak Pareto, which does not require selected allocations to be Pareto-efficient, IIA and essential single-valuedness lead us to a dictatorial ARSOF.
Theorem 1 is interesting not only in its content but also in what it implies about all allocation rules of the fairness literature. Since these rules typically satisfy Pareto-Efficiency and Anonymity, and do not give all resources to one individual, they must all violate IIA. Proposition 1 gave the same conclusion even more immediately, since these allocation rules are not constant.
We will illustrate this important lesson with a couple of examples. In the current framework, two prominent allocation rules have been identified by the fairness literature. The first one is the Egalitarian Walrasian AR S W , defined as follows:
Figure 1 shows how a change of preferences can alter the relative ranking of two allocations x and y without modifying individual preferences over these two allocations. In Figure 1a , x is selected and y is not, whereas the contrary obtains in Figure 1b , even though in both cases i prefers allocation y and j prefers allocation x.
The second prominent allocation rule is the Pazner-Schmeidler AR (see Pazner and Schmeidler 1978) S P S , defined by: x ∈ S P S (R) if x ∈ E(R) and there is α ∈ R + such that for all i ∈ N, 
Variants of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
The analysis in the previous section has revealed that the success of the theory of fairness is mainly due to departure from IIA. Then, one may ask in what sense IIA is violated or, more precisely, what additional information is taken into account by ARSOFs, that is forbidden by IIA. In the theory of social choice, the main approach with respect to information has been, following Sen (1970a, b) in particular, to introduce richer information about utilities. The theory of fairness, in contrast, has remained faithful to Arrow's initial project and usually retains only ordinal and interpersonally non-comparable information about preferences. If it introduces more information, it is about preferences, not about utilities. That is, preferences about "irrelevant" alternatives are taken into account by ARs.
It is possible to weaken IIA so as to take account of "irrelevant" alternatives (but not utilities) by strengthening the premise of the axiom in an appropriate way. This attempts brings us into several variants of the axiom, which will be introduced now. And in so doing we rely here on previous works by Hansson (1973) , Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996) , and the companion paper Fleurbaey, Suzumura and Tadenuma (2001) .
A first kind of additional information is contained in the marginal rates of substitution at the allocations to be compared. For efficient allocations, shadow prices enable one to compute the relative implicit income shares of different agents, thereby potentially providing a relevant measure of inequalities in the distribution of resources. Therefore, taking account of marginal rates of substitution is a natural extension of the informational basis of social choice theory in economic environments. Let C(x i , R i ) denote the cone of price vectors that support the upper contour set for R i at x i :
When preferences R i are strictly monotonic, one has C(x i , R i ) ⊂ R ++ whenever x i 0. One then can require the ranking of two allocations to depend on individual preferences between these two allocations and also on marginal rates of substitution at these allocations, but on that only:
IIA except Marginal Rates of Substitution (IIA-MRS
Marginal rates of substitution give an infinitesimally local piece of information about preferences at given allocations. A further extension of the informational basis allows the SOF to take account of finite parts of indifference hypersurfaces. The indifference sets are defined as
It is natural to focus on the part of indifference sets which lies within the feasible set. However, when considering any pair of allocations, the two allocations may need different amounts of total resources to be feasible and the global set F need not be relevant in its entirety. Therefore we need to introduce the following notions. The smallest amount of total resources which makes two allocations x and y feasible can be defined by ω(x, y) = (ω 1 (x, y), ..., ω (x, y) ), where for all k ∈ {1, ..., } :
For any vector t ∈ R + , define the set Ω(t) ⊂ R + by
The following axiom captures the idea that the ranking of two allocations should depend only on the indifference sets, and on preferences over the minimal subset in which the two allocations are feasible.
IIA except Indifference Sets on Feasible Allocations (IIA-ISFA):
It is immediate from the definitions that
Notice that IIA-MRS does not imply IIA-ISFA because the set I(x i , R i ) ∩ Ω(ω(x, y)) does not always provide enough information to determine C(x i , R i ).
6
It is also worthwhile here introducing a couple of independence conditions for ARs, which are closely related to IIA and its variants. Such conditions are quite common in the fairness literature. We will formulate them here for ARSOFs.
The first one, dealing with marginal rates of substitution, is essentially Nagahisa's (1991) 'Local Independence': 7
Independence of Preferences except MRS (IP-MRS
The next axiom says that only the parts of indifference sets concerning feasible allocations should matter.
Independence of Preferences except Indifference Sets on Feasible Allocations (IP-ISFA
Although these independence conditions may seem restrictive, they are actually not really stronger than the previous IIA axioms.
Proposition 3 On the class of ARSOFs that never select
0 = (0, . . . , 0),
IIA-MRS ⇒ IP-MRS, and IIA-ISFA ⇒ IP-ISFA.
Proof. IIA-MRS ⇒ IP-MRS. Let x ∈ SR(R) and R be such that for all
It is also easy to check that IP-MRS implies IIA-MRS, and that, for ARSOFs which never select allocations x such that i∈N x i = ω, IP-ISFA implies IIA-ISFA. In other words, for all practical purposes, the distinction between the IP axioms introduced here and their IIA counterparts is negligible.
Informational requirements for allocation rules
Even though the allocation rule characterized in Theorem 1 above is fully anonymous, it is not appealing because it contains only strongly unequal allocations. A minimal requirement of equality is the following:
Equal Treatment of Equals (for ARSOFs): ∀R ∈ R
This requirement is very minimal, and one may notice that any ARSOF R satisfying Anonymity and essential single-valuedness necessarily satisfies Equal Treatment of Equals.
From the statement and the proof of Theorem 1 we immediately deduce: The question we ask in this section is how much IIA needs to be weakened, or how much additional information is needed in order to obtain the existence of an ARSOF satisfying the above sets of conditions.
Our first result is that with IIA-MRS, a possibility is obtained, but there remains a difficulty about essential single-valuedness. 
where for all k ∈ {1, ..., }, f k is continuous, increasing, concave, and differentiable over R ++ , with lim x→0 f k (x) = +∞. The relevant property of this domain is that for all R ∈ (R * ) n ,
Let R ∈ (R * ) n be given. Firstly, suppose that there is x ∈ SR(R) \ S W (R). By Pareto-Efficiency x ∈ E(R). Hence, we have x i 0 or x i = 0 for all i ∈ N, and by differentiability of preferences there is a shadow price vector
n be a profile of homothetic (a given R in R * is homothetic if all its component functions f k are homogeneous of the same degree) and strictly convex preferences satisfying
We have x ∈ S W (R ). Moreover, by Theorem 1 in Eisenberg (1961) , all allocations in S W (R ) are Pareto-indifferent. By strict convexity of preferences, one therefore has S W (R ) = {x}. Since, by the previous argument,
In conclusion, SR(R) = S W (R) for all R ∈ (R * ) n . But S W is not essentially single-valued on the whole domain (R * ) n . This contradicts essential single-valuedness of SR.
Only with IIA-ISFA do we really obtain a full possibility result.
Theorem 3 There exists an essentially single-valued ARSOF satisfying Pareto-Efficiency, IIA-ISFA, Anonymity and Equal Treatment of Equals.
Proof. Consider the Pazner-Schmeidler ARSOFR S P S , defined at the end of section 4. It obviously satisfies Pareto-Efficiency, Anonymity and Equal Treatment of Equals. To check that it satisfies IIA-ISFA, let x, y ∈ F and R, R ∈ R n be such that for all i ∈ N,
and x ∈ S P S (R) and y / ∈ S P S (R). Let α ∈ R + be such that for all i ∈ N, x i I i αω. Then, necessarily α < 1. Notice that i∈N x i = ω because x ∈ E(R). Hence, Ω(ω(x, y)) = Ω(ω), and αω ∈ Ω(ω(x, y)). Together with the above equalities, we deduce that x ∈ S P S (R ) and y / ∈ S P S (R ).
7 Under Weak Pareto, social ordering functions need more information Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996) , in this model, showed that there exist many SOFs satisfying Weak Pareto, Anonymity and the following weak version of IIA:
IIA except Whole Indifference Sets (IIA-WIS
This axiom is weaker than all IIA axioms considered above, and one may ask what is the minimal amount of information needed by a SOF in order to satisfy Weak Pareto and Anonymity (or Non-Dictatorship). In Fleurbaey, Suzumura and Tadenuma (2001) , we showed that no SOFR satisfies Weak Pareto, Non-Dictatorship (over the subset X of allocations in which no agent has a zero bundle), and either IIA-MRS or IIA-ISFA.
But these results were obtained in the particular case of unbounded resources F = R n + . The bounded case on which we focus here has attracted less attention in the social choice literature, 9 and here we have the following result.
Theorem 4 There is no SOFR satisfying Weak Pareto, IIA-MRS and
Anonymity. There is no SOFR satisfying Weak Pareto, IIA-ISFA and Anonymity.
Proof. In order to prove the impossibility, it is convenient to consider different possible sizes of the population. For each a ∈ R + , define 
and on the subset
On B(x) ∪ B(y), one has
and on B(z) ∪ B(w),
it is possible to complete the definition of R 1 such that wP 1 x and yP 1 z. Then define R 2 so that it coincides with R 1 on S 1 ∪ S 2 , and on B(a) for all a ∈ {x, y, z, w}. Similarly, it is possible to complete the definition of R 2 such that xP 2 w and zP 2 y. Figure 3 illustrates this construction. If the profile of preferences is R = (R 1 , R 2 ), by Weak Pareto one has:
(y, x)P (R)(z, w) and (w, z)P (R)(x, y).
If the profile of preferences is R = (R 1 , R 1 ), by Anonymity one has:
(y, x)Ī(R )(x, y) and (w, z)Ī(R )(z, w).
Since R 1 and R 2 coincide on S 1 ∪ S 2 , and on B(a) for all a ∈ {x, y, z, w}, by IIA-MRS or IIA-ISFA, one has:
By transitivity, one gets (x, y)P (R)(x, y), which is impossible.
Case n = 3. Consider the bundles x = (8, 1/3, 0, ...), y = (12, 1/3, 0, ...), t = (10, 1/3, 0, ...), z = (1/3, 12, 0, ...), w = (1/3, 8, 0, ...), r = (1/3, 10, 0, ...) . Let preferences R 1 , R 2 and R 3 be defined as above on the subset S 1 ∪ S 2 , and on B(a) for all a ∈ {x, y, z, w}. Complete their definition so that yP 1 z, wP 1 x, tP 2 r, zP 2 y, xP 3 w, rP 3 t.
If the profile of preferences is R = (R 1 , R 2 , R 3 ), by Weak Pareto one has:
(y, t, x)P (R)(z, r, w) and (w, z, r)P (R) (x, y, t) .
If the profile of preferences is R = (R 1 , R 1 , R 1 ), by Anonymity one has:
(y, t, x)Ī(R )(x, y, t) and (w, z, r)Ī(R )(z, r, w).
Since R 1 , R 2 and R 3 coincide on S 1 ∪ S 2 , and on B(a) for all a ∈ {x, y, z, w}, by IIA-MRS or IIA-ISFA, one has: (x, y, t) and (w, z, r)Ī(R )(z, r, w) ⇔ (w, z, r)Ī(R) (z, r, w) .
By transitivity, one gets (x, y, t)P (R) (x, y, t) , which is impossible.
Case n = 2k. Partition the population into k pairs, and construct an argument similar to the case n = 2, with the bundles x = (8, 1/n, 0, ...), y = (12, 1/n, 0, ...), z = (1/n, 12, 0, ...), w = (1/n, 8, 0, ...) , and the allocations (y, x, y, x, ...) , (x, y, x, y, ...) , (z, w, z, w, ...) and (w, z, w, z, ...) .
Case n = 2k + 1. Partition the population into k − 1 pairs and one triple, and construct an argument combining the cases n = 2 and n = 3, with the bundles x = (8, 1/n, 0, ...), y = (12, 1/n, 0, ...), t = (10, 1/n, 0, ...), z = (1/n, 12, 0, ...), w = (1/n, 8, 0, ...), r = (1/n, 10, 0, ...), and the allocations (y, x, y, x, ..., y, t, x) , (x, y, x, y, ..., x, y, t) , (z, w, z, w, ...z, r, w) and (w, z, w, z, ..., w, z, r) .
This result proves that under Weak Pareto, more information about preferences is needed than under Pareto-Efficiency. In that sense, it is true that the theory of fairness, with its coarse orderings, is less demanding in information than the theory of social choice.
As explained in Fleurbaey, Suzumura and Tadenuma (2001) , however, one should not conclude from this analysis that full knowledge of indifference curves is needed under Weak Pareto. Define the Pazner-Schmeidler SOFR P S as follows: xR(R) y if and only if
This SOF satisfies Weak Pareto and Anonymity, even though it only requires knowledge of the intersection of indifference curves with a ray from the origin. In addition, although this SOF does not satisfy IIA-ISFA in the current framework, it can be shown to satisfy IIA-ISFA when only allocations of the subset
with no free disposal, instead of F, are ranked.
Toward a unified theory
There have been many attempts to import fairness concepts into social choice, and thereby build a unified theory, such as Feldman and Kirman (1974) , Varian (1976) , Suzumura (1981a Suzumura ( ,b, 1983 and Tadenuma (2002) . But they did not focus on the informational requirements to obtain positive results. Our approach provides a unified framework which covers the theory of social choice and the theory of fairness. Because ARs in the theory of fairness are isomorphic to ARSOFs in the theory of social choice, and ARSOFs are just a particular kind of SOF, the concept of SOF is comprehensive enough to encompass all relevant notions. This shows how the theory of fairness is, rigorously, a part of the theory of social choice.
As a consequence, the way in which possibility results are obtained with ARs, by broadening the informational basis, can be adopted for SOFs, albeit, as shown above, the amount of additional information needed is greater. From this perspective, there is no longer any reason to view the theory of social choice as plagued with impossibilities, and no longer any reason for social choice theorists to envy fairness theorists and their positive results.
The same recipe for success can be adopted by social choice theorists.
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In this section we examine two possible objections to this proposed integration of fair allocation theory into social choice theory. The first objection would go by recollecting that the celebrated Arrow Program of social choice theory consists of two separate steps, viz., (a) the construction of a social preference ordering corresponding to each and every profile of individual preference orderings; and (b) the construction of a social choice function in terms of the optimization of social preferences within each and every set of feasible social alternatives. The first step, which may be called the preference aggregation stage, is meant to determine the uniform social objective before the set of feasible social alternatives is revealed. The second step, which may be called the social choice stage, is meant to determine the rational social choice after the set of feasible social alternatives is revealed. Even though in the theory of fair allocation we may construct a coarse social ordering in terms of the fair allocations versus unfair allocations, such an ordering hinges squarely on the specification of the set of feasible allocations. Thus, the objection goes, in view of the basic scenario of the Arrow Program of social choice theory, the theory of fair allocation does not really offer much to the preference aggregation stage of social choice theory.
Our response to this objection is that what is called "social choice theory" in this paper actually encompasses the preference aggregation stage of the Arrow program, as presented above, as a particular case. We believe that it is quite convenient to see the common formal structure in all exercises of construction of a preference ordering over a set of alternatives, whether this set is determined by feasibility constraints or not. In this paper, the need to compare the social choice approach and the fair allocation approach has led us to retain
as the relevant set of alternatives. An orthodox vision of the Arrow Program of social choice theory might possibly require the construction of the social preference ordering to be made on the full set R n + , rather than F, but we do not think that the construction of a social preference ordering over F should be excluded from social choice theory for that reason.
11 Moreover, the notion of feasibility itself is multi-faceted. Although F is determined by some feasibility constraints, the set of actually feasible alternatives, in practical applications, is likely to be a strict subset of F. For instance, the political system may give special value to a status quo x 0 , and restrict attention to another particular alternative x, introduced as a proposed reform of the status quo. In order to decide whether x is better than x 0 or not, a finegrained ranking of all members of F is quite useful, and a ranking of all members of R n + would be perfectly adequate as well, but would be more than needed.
The second objection to our unification would rely on an alternative way of unifying the two theories, which has been elegantly formulated in Fishburn (1973) and adapted to economic environments by Le Breton (1997) . It consists in broadening the concept of AR, as done in the theory of social choice based on social decision rules (SDR).
Let F denote the set of non-empty subsets of F, and let A ⊂ F. An SDR is a mappingS from
The subset A is called an agenda, and A is the class of agendas.
An AR is just a particular kind of SDR, for which A = {F }. And one can recover a SOF from an SDR if A contains all pairs of allocations {x, y} ⊂ F and satisfies a choice consistency condition. The derived SOFRS is then defined by:
xRS(R) y ⇔ x ∈S (R, {x, y}) .
In this perspective, the specificity of the theory of fairness is that it has a very restricted class of agendas. This expresses the fact that the theory of fairness only seeks the good allocations among all feasible ones, whereas the theory of social choice wants to make fine-grained selections in most conceivable agendas.
That possibility results are obtained in the theory of fairness is likely to be interpreted, in this approach, as due to the restricted agendas, and this reinforces the usual explanation which opposes fine-grained social preferences and selection. But this would be a hasty conclusion. Arrow's independence condition, applied to SDRs, is formulated as follows in Le Breton (1997): simply states: 'Suppose that among the possible alternatives there are three, none of which gives any individual at least as much of both commodities as any other.' (Arrow 1963, p. 68 ; emphasis added) Bordes, Campbell and Le Breton (1995) study Arrow's theorem on F as a relevant social choice exercise.
Independence of Infeasible Alternatives (IIF): ∀R, R ∈ R
n , ∀A ∈ A, if ∀i ∈ N, ∀x, y ∈ A :
thenS(R, A) =S(R , A).
When the class of agendas is restricted, the amount of information about preferences that may be used byS when considering to choose x as against y increases automatically, because the subset A on which preference information is retained is larger. Therefore going to restricted agendas has two consequences. First, it makes one go from fine-grained preferences to coarse preferences, as emphasized by the usual explanation of the possibility results in fairness theory. Second, and, we believe, more importantly, it increases the amount of relevant information about preferences, as delineated by IIF.
Although the two unified theories (in terms of SOFs or in terms of SDRs) are essentially isomorphic, we are inclined to think that the SOF approach developed in this paper is more suitable to the analysis of the informational basis of the various theories. For instance, consider the Egalitarian Walrasian AR which only needs knowledge of marginal rates of substitution to decide whether an allocation is selected or not. In the SOF approach, this is easily captured by the IIA-MRS axiom, which is clearly a weakening of IIA. In the SDR approach, there is no as easy a way to modify IIF in order to capture the same idea. Because in order to check thatS(R, F ) =S(R , F ), that is, S W (R) =S W (R ), one needs to know marginal rates of substitutions at many allocations, and this requires global knowledge of R over a large subset of allocations. Moreover, S W , viewed as an SDR, does not even satisfy IIF because at corner allocations marginal rates of substitution may depend on preferences outside F.
Conclusion
In the traditional theory of social choice in economic environments, Fleurbaey, Suzumura and Tadenuma (2001) have shown that the construction of an Arrovian social ordering function, in a framework with purely ordinal, non-comparable preferences, requires information about the shape of indifference curves that goes well beyond purely local data such as marginal rates of substitution.
The main lesson of this paper is that even for the less ambitious project of constructing allocation rules, it is also necessary to introduce more information than allowed by the Arrovian independence of irrelevant alternatives. And the second lesson is that, nonetheless, a purely local information such as marginal rates of substitution is sufficient (or almost so) for allocation rules, whereas it is not so for social ordering functions. We hope that our paper, more broadly, contributes to clarifying the informational foundations in the theory of social choice and in the theory of fair allocation, and also to clarifying the links and differences between these two theories. Our proposal for a unified theory of social choice, where possibility results from the fairness part can be extended to SOFs, should shake off the negative fame of social choice.
